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Abstract—Network slicing is considered one of the key enabling
technologies for 5G due to its ability to customize and “slice” a
common resource to support diverse services and verticals. This
paper introduces a novel inter-operator network slicing framework
in which multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) can coor-
dinate and jointly slice their accessible spectrum resources in
both licensed and unlicensed bands. For licensed band slicing,
we propose an inter-operator spectrum aggregation method that
allows two or more MNOs to cooperate and share their licensed
bands to support a common set of service types. We then consider
the sharing of unlicensed bands. Because all MNOs enjoy equal
rights to accessing these bands, we introduce the concept of
right sharing for MNOs to share and trade their spectrum
access rights. We develop a modified back-of-the-envelope (mBoE)
method for MNOs to evaluate their Value-of-Rights (VoR) when
coexisting with other wireless technologies. A network slicing
game based on the overlapping coalition formation game is
formulated to investigate cooperation between MNOs. We prove
that our proposed game always has at least one stable slicing
structure that maximizes the social welfare. To implement our
proposed framework without requiring MNOs to reveal private
information to other MNOs, we develop a distributed algorithm
called Distributed Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers
with Partially Variable Splitting (D-ADMM-PVS). Performance
evaluation of our proposed framework is provided using a
discrete-event simulator that is driven by real MNO deployment
scenarios based on over 400 base station locations deployed by
two primary cellular operators in the city of Dublin. Numerical
results show that our proposed framework can almost double the
capacity for all supported services for each MNO in an urban
setting.
Index Terms—Network slicing, spectrum sharing, 5G, LTE/Wi-
Fi coexistence, game theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
To meet the demand for 5G networks, MNOs have taken
steps to secure more spectrum resources. In particular, the
concept of inter-operator spectrum sharing, also referred to as
the co-primary spectrum sharing [2], has been used to allow
two or more MNOs to share their licensed bands with each
other, therefore significantly increasing the spectrum instan-
taneously available to each individual MNO. Both FCC and
3GPP have recently set forth several initiatives aiming at en-
couraging spectrum sharing between MNOs. More specifically,
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3GPP Release 14 promotes the idea of radio access network
(RAN) sharing, which allows multiple MNOs to share network
resources, including infrastructure, network functions, and
spectrum to improve spectrum utilization and reduce system
roll-out cost/delay [3]. FCC has introduced new co-primary
shared access rules for several millimeter wave (mmWave)
bands to promote cooperation and spectrum sharing among
spectrum licensees [4]. To further alleviate spectrum scarcity
in commercial cellular systems, MNOs have been allowed
to extend their services to unlicensed bands, including the
5 GHz unlicensed-national-information-infrastructure (U-NII)
radio band [5] as well as the 57-64 GHz and 64-71 GHz bands,
recently opened up by FCC [4]. Currently, major MNOs such
as AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, and China Mobile, are actively
deploying network infrastructure to support cellular services
over unlicensed bands [5].
In addition to the improvement in transmission speeds
and supported traffic volumes, 5G networks are expected to
serve highly heterogenous services with diverse quality-of-
service (QoS) requirements. Network slicing is considered
a key enabler for 5G, due to its ability to create logical
partitions of a common resource such as radio spectrum
and/or network infrastructure. These partitions, known as the
network slices, can be orchestrated and customized according
to different service requirements. Existing works on network
slicing can be classified into two categories: infrastructure
slicing and spectrum resource slicing. The former allows a set
of common network equipments such as antennas, computing
and storage equipments to be “sliced” into logical networks
each of which can be tailored for each specific type of service.
The later focuses on partitioning of spectrum resources for
supporting different service types. In this paper, we focus on
the spectrum resource slicing and, to simplify our description,
we use ‘spectrum resource slicing’ and ‘network slicing’ inter-
changeably. Network slicing has the potential to significantly
improve spectrum efficiency and enable more flexible and
novel services with stringent QoS requirements that cannot
otherwise be supported by the existing architecture.
One key challenge in inter-operator network slicing that
remains relatively unexplored is how to efficiently allocate
resources over both licensed and unlicensed bands according to
different QoS requirements of different services. Licensed and
unlicensed bands exhibit different characteristics and require
different mechanisms to access. In particular, a licensed band
is typically allocated to an MNO for exclusive use. MNOs
have already carefully planned their network infrastructure
and adopted various centrally controlled resource scheduling
and allocation mechanisms to ensure optimal utilization and
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2reliable service support for user equipments (UEs). The un-
licensed band, on the other hand, is open to many different
wireless technologies. To reduce contention between coexist-
ing systems, Wi-Fi and licensed assisted access (LAA) LTE
standards rely on a carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)
mechanism, commonly referred to as listen-before-talk (LBT).
In this mechanism, both LAA and Wi-Fi transmitters must first
sense the channel and can only access it if it is deemed to be
idle. The uncertainty in the channel access delay in unlicensed
bands makes it difficult to support services with stringent QoS
requirements. Therefore, most existing works [6]–[8] focus on
network slicing focusing on licensed bands. How to share and
jointly slice the unlicensed spectrum among MNOs is still an
open problem.
In this paper, we address the above challenge by designing
a novel framework that allows multiple MNOs to jointly
distribute and orchestrate licensed and unlicensed spectrum
resources according to the service demands and requirements
of their UEs. More specifically, for licensed band slicing, we
propose an inter-operator spectrum aggregation method that
allows two or more MNOs to access each other’s licensed
spectrum. In this method, an MNO divides its licensed band
into partitions, each of which is intended to support a specific
type of service (i.e., a given set of QoS values). Multiple
MNOs can then aggregate their distributed licensed bands to
support traffic associated with the same type of service. We
introduce the concept of right sharing to investigate inter-
operator cooperation over unlicensed bands. According to this
concept, each MNO will first quantify the benefit that can
be obtained from operating on the unlicensed band, referred
to as the Value-of-Rights (VoR). MNOs can then negotiate
and trade their rights to access unlicensed bands according
to the estimated value. We propose a modified back-of-the-
envelope (mBoE) method for each MNO to estimate its VoR
as well as the potential performance improvement that can be
gained when one or more other MNOs are willing to give
up their rights for accessing the unlicensed band. We observe
that if each MNO is given the choice to slice both licensed
or unlicensed bands, the interaction between MNOs can be
very complex. For example, if an MNO cannot secure enough
licensed spectrum, it becomes more aggressive and willing
to pay more to other MNOs to reduce contention over the
unlicensed spectrum. Similarly, if the licensed spectrum can
offer sufficient resources to support the required traffic of an
MNO, this MNO will have more incentive to sell its right
over the unlicensed bands to other MNOs. To investigate the
interaction among MNOs, we develop a network slicing game
based on the overlapping coalition formation game. In this
game, MNOs can jointly decide the spectrum allocation as well
as distribution of the utility obtained in each network slice. A
network slicing structure can only result in a stable state when
no MNO can benefit from unilaterally deviating from this
structure. It is known that analyzing an overlapping coalition
formation game is notoriously difficult. Such a game does
not always admit a stable structure. Furthermore, allowing
overlaps between coalitions, e.g., each player instead of being
a member of a single coalition can be associated with mul-
tiple coalitions, results in infinitely many possible structures,
which makes exhaustive search-based methods, widely used in
typical partition-based coalition formation games, impossible
to apply. We prove that our proposed network slicing game
always admits at least one stable structure.
We observe that the existing centralized network slicing ar-
chitecture cannot be directly extended to the inter-operator sce-
nario. Accordingly, we develop a novel Distributed Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers with Partial Variable Splitting
(D-ADMM-PVS) algorithm to implement our proposed net-
work slicing in a distributed manner. D-ADMM-PVS does not
require back-and-forth exchange of private information among
MNOs. We prove that our proposed algorithm can approach
the stable and optimal network slicing structure in linear
time. Performance evaluation of our proposed framework is
provided using a discrete-event simulator that is driven by real
MNO deployment scenarios based on over 400 base station
locations deployed by two primary cellular operators in the
city of Dublin. Numerical results show that our proposed
framework can almost double the capacity for all supported
services for each MNO under the urban environment.
To evaluate the practical performance of our proposed
framework, we consider the actual base station (BS) topo-
logical deployment made by two major telecommunication
operators in Ireland coexisting with the Wi-Fi APs installed
at all the Starbucks coffee shops in the city of Dublin. We
consider the scenario that all the cellular BSs have been
upgraded to support LAA LTE operations. We develop a
C++-based discrete-event simulator using CSIM development
toolkit [9] to simulate the possible contention between LAA
BSs and Wi-Fi APs. Our numerical results show that our
proposed framework can almost double the capacity for all
supported services in the urban scenario even when only two
MNOs cooperate.
II. RELATED WORK
Inter-operator Spectrum Sharing in Licensed Band: Most
existing work on inter-operator spectrum sharing focuses on
licensed band sharing between MNOs with similar traffic
characteristics and spectrum allocations. More specifically,
European Commission’s Mobile and wireless communications
Enablers for Twenty-twenty Information Society (METIS)
future spectrum system concept [10] suggests two scenarios
for licensed band sharing between MNOs: limited spectrum
pooling (LSP) and mutual renting (MR). In LSP, two or more
MNOs contribute part of their licensed spectrum to form a
common pool [11]. All contributing MNOs have equal rights
to access the pool and should follow a mutually agreed upon
rule to access the pooled resource. MR allows each MNO to
temporally license part or all of its spectrum to another MNO.
In contrast to LSP, each MNO in MR can maintain a strict
access priority over its own licensed band [12]. Inter-operator
network sharing was also recently adopted by 3GPP, where
multiple MNOs can jointly manage the commonly shared
resource [3]. In [13], the authors studied the energy-efficient
spectrum cooperation between different cellular systems with
the objective of reducing MNOs’ operational costs. The au-
thors in [14] investigated the optimal investment and pricing
3Fig. 1. (a) 3GPP’s active network sharing management architecture and (b)
our proposed inter-operator network slicing framework.
decision of a cognitive mobile virtual network operator under
uncertain spectrum supply.
Licensed Band Network Slicing: Inter-operator resource
sharing has recently been studied from the network slicing
perspective [6]–[8]. In particular, in [8], a resource alloca-
tion mechanism called the Fisher market was used to study
resource allocation across slices. In [7], a signaling-based net-
work slicing broker solution was proposed to achieve accurate
traffic prediction, slice scheduling, and admission control. The
authors in [6] proposed a fine-grained resource allocation for
slices of licensed spectrum both in terms of bandwidth and
cloud processing. In [15], the authors investigated the problem
of VNF placement. Two algorithms have been proposed. The
first one calculates the optimal number of virtual instances
of 4G (MME, SGW, and PGW) or 5G (AMF, SMF, and
AUSF) core network elements and the second one derives
the placement of these virtual instances over a federated
cloud. In [16], the authors carried out series of experiments
involving the deployment of different VM flavors to determine
the proper amount of resources that are most suitable to
host a virtualized evolve packet cores (vEPCs) considering
the business requirements it has to accomplish. In [17], the
authors assessed the potential of network slicing to provide
the appropriate customization and highlights its technology
challenges. In [18], the authors introduced a 5G architecture
that enables the orchestration, instantiation and management
of end-to-end network slices over multiple administrative and
technological domains. For more detailed survey of network
slicing in 5G network architecture, we refer the reader to [19],
[20] and the references therein.
Inter-operator Spectrum Sharing in Unlicensed Band:
Compared to the resource sharing over licensed bands, the
sharing of unlicensed spectrum is much more complicated due
to the heterogeneity of coexisting systems and technologies.
In [21], the authors studied a scenario in which the unlicensed
band can be divided into several partitions, each of which can
be exclusively accessed by one MNO. A spectrum sharing
scheme was proposed to allow spectrum borrowing and lend-
ing among MNOs. Motivated by recent observations that Wi-
Fi and LTE coexistence in the unlicensed band could result in
more than 70% throughput degradation for Wi-Fi systems [22],
[23], many existing works focused on developing mechanisms
to ensure fair coexistence between LTE and Wi-Fi [24]. For
example, the authors in [24] proposed to adjust the contention
parameters of LAA to achieve a fair coexistence between Wi-
Fi systems and co-locating LAA cells.
III. DISTRIBUTED NETWORK SLICING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we introduce a distributed network slicing
framework that allow multiple MNOs to decide the slicing
of their accessible spectrum resources in both licensed and
unlicensed bands. We consider a set of Y types of services,
labeled as Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y }, to be supported by all MNOs.
To manage and orchestrate the spectrum slicing over multiple
MNOs with a diverse set of services, we introduce a software-
define networking (SDN)-based framework, in which the con-
trol functions are implemented by a set of programmable
network entities referred to as the SDN orchestrators each
of which can coordinate the resource allocation among the
network infrastructures within a specific coverage area. Our
framework extends from 3GPP’s active network sharing man-
agement architecture [3]. In the 3GPP’s architecture, a master
operator (MOP) deploys a so-called MOP’s network manager
(MOP-NM), a centralized SDN-controller to collect global
information and manage the allocation of the shared radio
resource among multiple participating operators (POPs), as
illustrated in Figure 1(a). This centralized management ap-
proach cannot be directly applied to optimize a large-scale
inter-operator slicing system due to the following reasons.
First, in the 3GPP’s architecture, MOP-NM monitors and con-
trols a fixed amount of resource (e.g., network infrastructure
and/or spectrum) shared among a fixed set of POPs. However,
in practice, different MNOs can have different demands and
requirements for different services. In this scenario, each
MNO may like to cooperate with different subsets of MNOs
to support different types of services. Second, the 3GPP’s
architecture is limited to sharing licensed band resources.
Compared to licensed bands, unlicensed bands are open to
all and contain much wider bandwidth for MNOs to access.
At the same time, unlicensed bands require different spectrum
access mechanisms than those used for licensed bands. Third,
POPs can share network infrastructure and resources across
a wide geographical area. Allowing the MOP-NM to always
collect global information from all POPs will lead to network
congestion and intolerably high latencies. Fourth, some POPs
may not want to disclose their private proprietary information
to the MOP.
To address the above issues, we introduce a distributed
framework based on a set of SDN orchestrators that can be
distributed throughout a large service area. An orchestrator
can reside in a serving gateway (S-GW) of a single MNO
or a gateway core network (GWCN) share among multiple
MNOs. If an MNO decides to jointly slice resources with
other MNOs to serve UEs in a specific coverage area, it
4will coordinate through the local SDN orchestrator to decide
how much spectrum resource to be distributed for each type
of service before creating service instances. The orchestrator
can only access the core network elements such as Mobility
Management Entity (MME) and Package Data Gateways (P-
GW) e.g., via S1 interface, of a group of MNOs when a
contract has been mutually agreed upon. In our framework,
MNOs are self-interested and will only cooperate with each
other if all the MNOs can benefit from cooperation and also
obtain a fair share of the total revenue. We focus on distributed
optimization of resource slicing among MNOs according to
different service requirements taking into account the different
spectrum and channel access mechanisms in licensed and
unlicensed bands.
IV. INTER-OPERATOR NETWORK SLICING
In this section, we first propose the inter-operator network
slicing for licensed bands in Section IV-A. For network slicing
over unlicensed bands, we introduce the concept of VoR for
each MNO in Section IV-B. Finally, we formulate the joint
network slicing problem over licensed and unlicensed bands
in Section IV-C.
A. Network Slicing for Licensed Bands
We consider a wireless system consisting of a set of M
MNOs, labeled asM = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Each MNO i, i ∈M,
can provide services through its network infrastructures, e.g.,
BSs, Bi Hz bandwidth of licensed spectrum. Each MNO can
offer at most Y types of service each of which is associated
with a specific QoS requirement, e.g., a minimum throughput
that must be guaranteed. In this paper, we consider systems
under backlogged traffic such that each UE always generates
saturated traffic for all supported service types. This assump-
tion is reasonable in the sense that previous study shows
that only limited performance improvement can be achieved
by network slicing when a limited service traffic has been
requested. Let η(l)i be the minimum throughput that is required
by type l service offered by MNO i.
Each MNO can divide and aggregate the contiguous and
uncontiguous parts of the licensed band to support various
types of services. Each MNO i divides Bi frequency band into
a set of subcarriers, each of which can be allocated to support
a particular service type. Generally speaking, the bandwidth
of a subcarrier is much smaller than Bi. For example, in
LTE, the minimum bandwidth for each subcarrier is 15 kHz
and the maximum bandwidth that can be allocated to an
individual service is 100MHz with carrier aggregation [25].
The bandwidth that can be accessed by each MNO will be
higher if two or more MNOs can aggregate their licensed band
together using 3GPP network sharing architecture [3]. We can,
therefore, assume the licensed band is continuously dividable
among different types of service.
Instead of accessing its own licensed band, each MNO can
also negotiate with other MNOs to form a group for possible
sharing of the licensed bands. We refer a group of MNOs
that decide to share their licensed bands with each other for
supporting type l service as a Service Support Group (SSG)
denoted as C(l) for C(l) ⊆M.
Let w(l)i be the portion of licensed band distributed by MNO
i to support the lth type of service. We have 0 ≤ w(l)i ≤ Bi.
MNOs in C(l) will aggregate their allocated licensed bands for
type l service traffic. We can then write the total aggregated
licensed spectrum allocated by MNOs to support type l service
as w(l) =
∑
i∈C(l) w
(l)
i . Let Li be the set of all the communica-
tion links associated with UEs of MNO i. We write d(l)k,i as the
portion of w(l) that can be accessed by the kth communication
link (e.g., uplink or downlink from each UE or BS) to send
data traffic associated with type l service, i.e., the total spec-
trum that can be accessed by each link k of MNO i is given
by u(l)k,i = d
(l)
k,iw
(l) for
∑
k∈Li,i∈M u
(l)
k,i ≤ w(l). Each link
associated with a member MNO will follow a mutually agreed
scheduling procedure to access the aggregated spectrum. The
final portion of aggregated spectrum that can be accessed by
each link will also depend on the specific network topology as
well as traffic from other nearby UEs. For example, suppose
n links co-located in the same area send requests for the
same type l service at the same time. A commonly adopted
approach is to equally allocate the aggregated spectrum to each
service requesting link, i.e., we have d(l)k,i =
1
n and each link
k is allocated with u(l)k,i =
w(l)
n bandwidth of the aggregated
spectrum. In this paper, we consider a generalized framework
in which each MNO can optimize vector ui = 〈u(l)k,i〉k∈Li,l∈Y
consisting of the allocated spectrum for each type of service
at each link. More specifically, we can write the utility
obtained by MNO i for serving type l service at the kth
link as pi(l)k,i
(
u
(l)
k,i
)
= ρ
(l)
i u
(l)
k,iRk,i where ρ
(l)
i is the price per
data bit charged by MNO i by serving type l service and
Rk,i = log2 (1 + SNRk,i) is the throughput per unit (Hz)
achieved by link k and SNRk,i is the received signal-to-noise
ratio for link k when it is the only link to access the channel.
If two or more MNOs perform network slicing by jointly
sharing their licensed bands, we can write the optimization
problem for each MNO i as follows:
max
ui=〈u(l)k,i〉k∈Li,l∈Y
∑
k∈Li
∑
l∈Y
pi
(l)
k,i
(
u
(l)
k,i
)
(1a)
s.t.
∑
l∈Y
u
(l)
k,i ≤
∑
j∈C(l)
Bj and Rk,iu
(l)
k,i ≥ η(l)i ,
∀k ∈ Li, l ∈ Y, (1b)
where the first term in (1b) means that the combined licensed
spectrum allocated to each link for supporting all types of
service cannot exceed the total available bandwidth owned by
the resource sharing MNOs. And the second term in in (1b)
specifies the minimum throughput that must be guaranteed for
each supported type of service.
The licensed band network slicing can be directly imple-
mented by the co-primary spectrum shared access specified in
METIS’ future spectrum system concept with LSP mode [2].
In particular, if MNOs in an SSG decide to operate in the LSP,
all the member MNOs will negotiate for a group license and
use the inter-operator carrier aggregation strategy proposed in
5[12] to form a common resource pool w(l) to support type l
service.
B. Network Slicing for Unlicensed Band
Compared to the sharing of licensed band in which each
MNO has an exclusively licensed resource that can be traded
with others, in the unlicensed band, all MNOs enjoy the same
right to access the same amount of spectrum resource. How to
develop a framework that can incentivize the sharing among
MNOs for their spectrum access rights in the unlicensed band
is still an open problem.
We propose the concept of (spectrum access) right sharing
for inter-operator network slicing in unlicensed band. In this
concept, each MNO can share its spectrum access right with
other MNOs. Before we formally introduce the concept, we
need to first characterize the value-of-rights (VoR) for each
MNO in the unlicensed band. We have the following observa-
tions:
C1) The VoR of an MNO in unlicensed band depends on its
benefit that can be obtained in the unlicensed band. Dif-
ferent MNOs can observe different benefits in unlicensed
band. The MNOs that can obtain higher benefits in the
unlicensed band will less likely to give up their rights
compared to others.
C2) The compensation that can be provided by an MNO i for
another MNO j to give up the right to access unlicensed
band is closely related to the benefit improvement that
can be obtained by MNO i when the UEs and the BSs
associated with MNO j stop accessing the unlicensed
band. In other words, some MNOs are willing to pay
higher prices than others for the right of a certain MNO.
C3) When an individual MNO stop accessing the unlicensed
band, all the other co-locating MNOs can benefit from
the reduction of channel contending UEs and BSs.
From C1) and C2), we can observe that it is important for
each MNO to first pre-evaluate its benefit that can be obtained
in the unlicensed band. From C3), we can observe that it makes
sense to let all the beneficial MNOs to cooperate and jointly
compensate to the MNOs that are willing to stop accessing
the unlicensed band.
Let us now introduce the inter-operator right sharing frame-
work in unlicensed band.
1) LAA Protocol: Before we discuss the right sharing
in unlicensed bands, let us first briefly review the CSMA-
based LAA protocol. Since the unlicensed band is open to
all wireless technologies, to avoid the collision and cross-
interference, data transmission is required to follow an LBT-
based channel access mechanism. In this mechanism, each
UE or BS must first sense the vacancy of the channel for a
duration of time called distributed inter-frame spacing (DIFS).
If the channel is sensed busy, the UE or BS will defer the
transmission until the channel becomes idle and then wait
for a DIFS duration plus a random number, referred to as
the backoff counter number, of time slots before accessing
the channel. The value of the backoff counter is uniformly
randomly generated between 0 and an integer value called
contention window CW . The backoff counter is decremented
one-by-one for each time slot till zero when the channel is
idle. In case that the channel is occupied by other neighboring
UE or BS, the backoff counter will be frozen until the channel
is sensed to be idle again.
As observed from the above description, it is generally
impossible to guarantee the successful channel access in the
unlicensed band, e.g., even the probability of channel access
is high, there is still a small chance that an LTE UE or BS
cannot send any data packet on the unlicensed band.
Let ξk,i be the probability of channel access for the kth
link associated MNO i. We also use B(u) to denote the total
amount of spectrum resource of the unlicensed band.
2) Estimation of Probability of Access in Unlicensed Band:
Before negotiating with other MNOs, an MNO needs to first
pre-evaluate the potential benefit that can be obtained in the
unlicensed band. It also needs to identify whether to negotiate
with one or more other MNOs for the possibility of giving up
their rights in the unlicensed band. Similarly, once an MNO
receives a request from other MNOs about the possibility
to give up its right to access the unlicensed band, it needs
to estimate how much damage it will cause and how much
compensation it should expect from the requesting MNOs. In
this paper, we assume the benefit of each MNO in unlicensed
bands is closely related to its probability of channel access for
its BSs and UEs.
We introduce an mBoE method for each MNO to pre-
evaluate the probability of access for each of its links. The ba-
sic idea is to generate a graphical model that can characterize
the possible contention among all the intra- and inter-operator
links as well as the channel contentions from other coexisting
wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi. Our mBoE method is
extended from the original back-of-the-envelop (BoE) method
previously introduced in [26]. BoE is a simple and effective
method that can quickly calculate the probability of access of
a contention graph without requiring any detailed information
about locations and transmission parameters.
Unfortunately, the original BoE cannot be directly applied
into LAA system due to the following reasons: 1) the original
BoE method was built on a homogeneous 802.11 network in
which all the devices have the same contention parameters.
In our system, the LAA BSs and UEs coexist with other
wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi, 2) the BoE method needs
to have a complete contention graph consisting of all the
communication links and the calculation of each link requires
to consult the entire network topology. However, in our muti-
MNO system, each MNO cannot know the relative locations of
UEs or BSs associated with other MNOs. To address these two
issues, our mBoE is built on an empirical table consisting of
the pre-measured probability of access of each LAA BS and
UE when contending with different subsets of Wi-Fi and/or
other LAA transmitters under different network topologies.
Compared to the original BoE method, our proposed mBoE
method provides an improved estimation results with reduced
computation complexity. In addition, our mBoE can calculate
the probability of access for each local link using only the
local network topology.
Before we introduce the detailed method, let us introduce
the following assumptions. Note that these assumptions are
6TABLE I
WI-FI AND LAA CHANNEL ACCESS PARAMETERS [27]
DIFS CWmin CWmax TXOP
802.11ac 34 ms 3 7 1.504ms
LAA 25 ms 3 7 2 msec
only introduced for justifying the mBoE method and are
not necessary for our network slicing game or distribution
algorithms introduced later in the paper.
A1) Each UE or BS can sense the transmission of neighboring
UEs and BSs which can be associated other MNOs as
well as Wi-Fi transmitters,
A2) The time duration for random backoff countdown can be
considered as negligible, compared to the duration spent
on data transmission,
A3) The probability distributions of the long-term residual
backoff countdown time and data transmission time are
stationary.
Assumption A1) is adopted by many existing works and
is commonly considered as reasonable because both LAA
and Wi-Fi use OFDM to send data signal which is known
to contain a periodically repetitive signal to be sent for
mitigating inter-symbol interference (ISI), channel estimation,
and network synchronization purpose. More specifically, LTE
and Wi-Fi transmit signals, like any other OFDM modulated
signal, adopt the concept of cyclic prefix (CP) to mitigate ISI
between two consecutive symbols. The CP is a replication of
the end of an OFDM symbol that is copied and added to the
beginning of that symbol. Each LAA UE and BS can estimate
the correlation between consecutive data signals and detect the
time duration (TXOP duration) for each channel occupancy
with a simple sliding-window approach [28]. In addition to
the CP-based approach, the UEs and BSs can also sense the
preamble, a known data sequence sent at the beginning of
each Wi-Fi frame for channel estimation as well as the LTE
reference signals periodically sent by each LTE transmitter to
support synchronization to detect their neighboring transmit-
ters. See Table I for a list of transmission parameters of LAA
release 13 [27] and 802.11ac Wi-Fi standard [29].
Note that due to the channel fading and shadowing effects,
there may exist the so called “hidden nodes”, i.e., some BSs
or UEs cannot always successfully detect the transmission of
their neighboring devices. Since our mBoE method is built
on an empirical probability of access table obtained from
previous measurements, the effect of the hidden nodes has
already been captured in the measuring results. The impact of
the hidden nodes can be further reduced by allowing MNOs
who have the intention to cooperate to share their sensing
results with each other. Each MNO can also extract the local
information about channel contenting Wi-Fi transmitters from
the beacon signal broadcasted by the connected Wi-Fi APs to
further improve its sensing accuracy. Assumption A2) follows
the same observation as [26]. In particular, the countdown time
of different links may occur concurrently which in some sense
cancels the total amount of time spent on resolving the possible
collisions among channel contending links. We implement
the most recent LAA specification in [27] into our CSIM-
based simulator and our experimental results also verify this
observation. In other words, the random backoff mechanism
introduced in the CSMA protocols can successfully avoid the
collision among channel contending devices for most of the
time and therefore in our measuring results, the data transmis-
sion time dominates the channel access time. Assumption 3)
has been proved in [30] and also verified in our recent work
[28].
The first step of mBoE method is to establish a contention
graph that can capture all the contention between the coex-
isting devices for each MNO. We formally define contention
graph as follows.
Definition 1: A contention graph for a multi-operator LAA
system coexisting with other technologies such as Wi-Fi in
the unlicensed band is a graph G = 〈V, E〉 comprising a set
V of vertices corresponding to the set of all the coexisting
links connecting UEs and BSs associated with all the MNOs
as well as the coexisting Wi-Fi links and a set E of edges each
of which connects two vertices that can sense the existence of
each other. We also define the contention subgraph associated
with MNO i as the subgraph Gi of G comprising subsets of
vertices and edges corresponding to communication links that
are only associated with MNO i as well as their sensed entities
of other MNOs and Wi-Fi systems.
Note that it has been verified in [26] that if two or more
contending links are associated with the same technology (e.g.,
LAA) coexisting with the same set of neighboring devices, the
probability for each link to successfully access the channel
can be considered as equal. If two contending links belong to
different technologies, e.g., one link is a LAA link and the
other is a Wi-Fi link, then the probability of access must be
pre-calculated and pre-stored in a table.
In Figure 2, we have listed the measured average probability
of access under different contention topologies using our
developed CSIM-based simulator. Note that since the LAA
Release 13 only supports downlink transmission in unlicensed
bands, the number of possible contention graphical topologies
that involves each BS should be limited, e.g., if all the
LAA transmitters correspond to BSs deployed by MNOs, the
maximum number of BSs contending with each other in each
local area will be equivalent to the number of MNOs. In
addition, as observed in many existing results that as the
number of channel contending devices becomes large, the
probability of channel access will drop significantly. It is
therefore unnecessary for each BS to maintain a table that
includes a large number of coexisting devices.
Note that in Figure 2 we observe that the probability of
access for a Wi-Fi AP is always lower than that of the LAA
BS. This is because we have adopted the most recent LAA
specification in Table I in which the LAA BS has a shorter
DIFS waiting time as well as longer TXOP transmission
duration compared to these parameters in 802.11ac Wi-Fi
standard. This observation is consistent with the result reported
in [30].
We define the maximum independent set for MNO i as
follows:
Definition 2: An independent set associated with MNO i is
a set of vertices in Gi in which no two of which are adjacent.
A maximum independent set for MNO i is an independent set
with the largest possible size for graph Gi.
7(0.914, 0.067, 0.914)
Contention
Graph Probability of Access
(0.659, 0.341)
(0.979, 0.010, 0.979)
(0.418, 0.162, 0.418)
(0.229, 0.540, 0.229)
LAA BS        Wi-Fi AP
(0.141, 0.141, 0.358, 0.358)
(0.977, 0.005, 0.968)
(0.978, 0.003, 0.976)
(0.097, 0.299, 0.299, 0.299)
(0.132, 0.132, 0.458, 0.132, 0.132)
(0.084, 0.373, 0.373, 0.084, 0.084)
Contention
Graph Probability of Access
(0.054, 0.296, 0.296, 0.296, 0.054)
(0.036, 0.237, 0.237, 0.237, 0.237)(0.181, 0.181, 0.181, 0.456)
Fig. 2. Table of contention subgraphs and the corresponding probability of
access measured by our CSIM simulator.
It is known that the maximum independent sets of a given
graph can be found by standard approaches in polynomial time
[31].
One of the main idea behind our proposed procedure is that
the maximum independent sets dominate the possible channel
contention as well as channel access among all the entities
associated with different MNOs coexisting in the same area.
In particular, the following proposition has been proved in
[26].
Proposition 1: [26, Propositions 1] A CSMA-based system
spends most of its time in the maximum independent sets and
very little time in other states.
We write the vector for the probability of access for all links
associated with MNO i as ξi = 〈ξk,i〉k∈Li .
Each MNO can then use the following procedure to estimate
the probability of access for each of its links:
P1) Establish a contention subgraph Gi in unlicensed band
using the sensing results from the UEs and BSs of MNO
i,
P2) Each MNO i can then identify the possible maximum
independent sets of Gi using standard approaches,
P3) Each MNO i generates a modified subgraph G′i by re-
moving all the vertices that are not associated with any
maximum independent set from Gi,
P4) Each MNO i searches for the probability of channel
access ξk,i for each link k from the pre-stored contention
subgraph table.
Since each MNO can detect the contention from other
MNOs, it can also estimate the possible improvement of
the channel access probability if one or more other MNOs
stop accessing the unlicensed band. We define the estimated
contention subgraph Gi\j for MNO i as a subgraph of Gi
such that all vertices associated with links from MNO j are
removed for i 6= j. By replacing graph Gi with subgraph
Gi\j in procedure P1), MNO i can re-estimate the resulting
probability of channel access ξk,i\j for each of its links
following procedures P2) to P4). Let ξi\j = 〈ξk,i\j〉k∈Libe
the vector of channel access probabilities for all the links
associated with MNO i when BSs of MNO j stops accessing
the unlicensed band for i 6= j.
Fig. 3. Use mBoE to calculate the probability of access in an urban
environment: (a) real locations of the BSs, (b) abstracted contention graph,
and (c) channel access probability estimated from our proposed mBoE method
compared with the real probabilities generated by our CSIM simulator.
To verify the performance of our proposed mBoE method,
we consider an urban region in the city of Dublin consisting of
BSs deployed by two major MNOs in Ireland as well as Wi-Fi
APs installed at Starbucks coffee shops in Figure 3. In par-
ticular, we calculate the probability of access estimated from
the procedures P1)–P4) and compare these results with the
real channel access probability obtained from our developed
CSIM simulator. Our result shows that the proposed mBoE
can successfully estimate the probability of channel access for
each MNO.
3) Inter-operator Right Sharing: As mentioned previously,
the performance degradation of an MNO for giving up its
right to access the unlicensed band should be compensated
by all the other MNOs that can benefit from the reduction
of channel contention. A mutual agreement must be reached
by the right-giving-up MNOs and the MNOs that are willing
to provide compensations. Let D be the set of MNOs that are
willing to give up their rights to access the unlicensed band for
D ⊂ M. How to divide the utility between the right-giving-
up MNOs and the rest of the MNOs depends on the detailed
requirements and the benefit that can be achieved by each
MNO. In this paper, we employ a common adopted setting
called transferrable utility in which the utility obtained by
the MNOs in the unlicensed band can be freely transferred
between different member MNOs. We will give a more
detailed description about this framework in the next section.
From the previous discussion, the unlicensed band resources
that can be accessed by the kth link of MNO i is specified by
the probability of channel access ξk,i\D. Each MNO can then
distribute the channel access at each link according to the QoS
of the supported types of services. Let α(l)k,i be the portion of
the channel access probability that is allocated to support type
l service at link k of MNO i. We have
∑
l∈Y α
(l)
k,i = ξk,i\D.
We also write α(l)i = 〈α(l)k,i〉k∈Li and αi = 〈α(l)i 〉l∈Y . We can
write the utility obtained by MNO i from supporting type l
service at the kth link as ν(l)k,i(α
(l)
k,i) = ρ
(l)
i α
(l)
k,iB
(u)Rk,i.
We can write the resource allocation problem in unlicensed
8bands as
max
αi
∑
k∈Li
∑
l∈Y
ν
(l)
k,i
(
α
(l)
k,i
)
(2a)
s.t.
∑
l∈Y
α
(l)
k,i = ξk,i\D and α
(l)
k,iB
(u)Rk,i ≥ η(l)i , ∀k ∈ Li, l ∈ Y.
C. Network Slicing over Licensed and Unlicensed Bands
It can be observed that the network slicing decision made by
MNOs in licensed and unlicensed bands can be closely related
to each other. In particular, if an MNO cannot secure enough
spectrum resource in the licensed band, it will become more
aggressive in the unlicensed band and will be willing to pay
more for the right of other MNOs. Similarly, if the licensed
band can offer sufficient resources for some MNOs to support
their traffics, these MNOs will be more willing to sell their
right in unlicensed band.
The main objective for each MNO is to carefully decide the
resource distributed in both licensed and unlicensed bands for
each slice. Let $(l)k,i
(
α
(l)
k,i, u
(l)
k,i
)
= pi
(l)
k,i
(
u
(l)
k,i
)
+ ν
(l)
k,i
(
α
(l)
k,i
)
.
Each MNO i decides the optimal resource distribution by
solving the following problem:
max
ui,αi
∑
k∈Li
∑
l∈Y
$
(l)
k,i
(
α
(l)
k,i, u
(l)
k,i
)
(3a)
s.t.
∑
l∈Y
α
(l)
k,i = ξk,i\D and
∑
l∈Y
u
(l)
i ≤
∑
j∈C(l)
Bj , (3b)
(u
(l)
k,i + α
(l)
k,iB
(u))Rk,i ≥ η(l)i , ∀k ∈ Li, l ∈ Y (3c)
where the first term in (3b) means that the channel access
probability allocated by each link k to support each type l of
service cannot exceed the total probability of channel access
that can be obtained by each BS. (3c) means that the combined
throughput obtained in both licensed and unlicensed band for
each type of services must satisfy the minimum throughout
requirement.
V. NETWORK SLICING GAME
To model the negotiation and interaction among multiple
MNOs, we apply the framework of the overlapping coalition
formation game. The overlapping coalition formation game
attracts much attention recently due to its capability to in-
vestigate the resource allocation problem between multiple
players that can allocate different portions of their resources to
simultaneously support different types of services by joining
as members of different coalitions [32]. Compared to the
traditional partition-based coalition formation game, allowing
players to interaction with each other across multiple coalitions
has the potential to further improve the resource utilization
efficiency and increase the outcome for the players. We
formally define network slicing game as follows.
Definition 3: A network slicing game is defined by a tuple
A = 〈M,B,Y,$〉 where M is the set of MNOs that may
share spectrum with each other, B = ∪i∈MBi × B(u) is the
spectrum that can be accessed by MNOs in both licensed and
unlicensed bands, Y is the set of service types supported by
each MNO, $ is the vector of utilities obtained by the MNOs.
We give a more detailed discussion for each of the above
elements in the network slicing game as follows: each MNO
can access licensed and unlicensed band spectrum. The li-
censed band that can be accessed by each MNO includes
both its own licensed band as well as licensed bands owned
by other MNOs that can be accessed through inter-operator
carrier aggregation described in Section IV-A. Each MNO can
access the unlicensed spectrum through channel contention
following the CSMA mechanism. The main objective for each
MNO is to slice the shared licensed spectrum as well as
the access probability of unlicensed spectrum to support all
types of service. Each type l of service is specified by a
threshold η(l)i characterizing the minimum QoS that needs to
be be guaranteed by each MNO i and a price ρ(l)i describing
the unit price charged by MNOs for supporting the service.
A slice c(l) is a vector c(l) = 〈c(l)1 , c(l)2 , . . . , c(l)M 〉 where
c
(l)
i = 〈w(l)i ,α(l)i 〉 is the resource allocated by MNO i to
support type l service. Each slice comprises of portions of
licensed spectrum and portions of channel access probability
in unlicensed band allocated to the supported service type.
The licensed spectrum distributed to support type l service is
given by w(l) = 〈w(l)i 〉i∈C(l) . The access probabilities of the
unlicensed band allocated by MNOs to support type l service
can be written as α(l) = 〈α(l)k,i〉k∈Li,i∈M. α(l)k,i = 0 means that
MNO i does not access any unlicensed spectrum to support
type l service for link k.
We define a network slicing structure c = 〈c(l)〉l∈Y as a
vector specifying the resource allocations of all the MNOs
among all types of service.
We consider a game with transferrable utility in which the
utility obtained in a slice can be freely transferred among
contributing MNOs. A characterization function maps each
slice of MNOs into a single value referred to as the worth
of a slice. The worth characterizes the total utility that is
available to all the contributing MNOs. The worth for each
slice consists of utilities obtained from both licensed and
unlicensed bands. We can write the worth of a slice c(l) as
v
(
c(l)
)
=
∑
i∈supp(c(l))
∑
k∈Li
$
(l)
k,i where supp (·) is the support.
We can observe that the worth function is monotone. In
particular, suppose c(l) and c′(l) are two possible slices for
supporting type l service. We then have v
(
c(l)
) ≥ v (c′(l))
for any c(l), c′(l) such that c(l)i ≥ c′(l)i for all i ∈M. In other
words, MNOs will always allocate all the accessible spectrum
to serve the supported service.
We define an allocation of utility for each slice as x(l) =
〈x(l)i 〉i∈supp(c(l)) which describes the worth distributed among
all the MNOs. x(l) is efficient if
∑
i∈supp(c(l)) x
(l)
i = v
(
c(l)
)
.
x(l) is also called imputation if it is efficient and satisfies the
individual rationality, i.e., x(l)i ≥ v
(
c¯
(l)
i
)
where c¯(l)i is the
slice for type l service if MNO i cannot cooperate and share
spectrum resources with other MNOs. We define a network
slicing agreement as a tuple 〈c,x〉 where x = 〈x(l)〉l∈Y .
As mentioned earlier, MNOs are self-interest entities and
always seek to maximize their individual utilities by forming
coalitions with different MNOs in both licensed and unli-
censed bands. However, the resource distribution and negotia-
9tion among MNOs across different slices can be very complex.
For example, when an MNO negotiating with another MNO
for sharing their resources to serve a specific type of service,
it can also offer a certain term that may affect the cooperation
with other MNOs in serving other types of service. Similarly,
when an MNO deviates from a network slicing agreement with
another MNO in serving a specific type of service, it can also
affect its cooperation with other MNOs supporting other types
of service. The main solution concept in the network slicing
game is the core. We extend the concept of the conservative
core in the overlapping coalition formation game into our
network slicing game.
Definition 4: Given a network slicing game A =
〈M,B,Y,$〉 and a subset of MNOs N ⊆ M. Suppose
〈c,x〉 and 〈c′,x′〉 are two network slicing agreements such
that for any slice c(l) ∈ c either supp(c(l)) ⊆ N or
supp(c(l)) ⊆M\N . We say that network slicing agreement
〈c′,x′〉 is a profitable deviation of N from 〈c,x〉 if for all
j ∈ N , we have $j (c′,x′) > $j (c,x). We say that a net-
work slicing agreement 〈c,x〉 is in the core of A if no subset
of N has a profitable deviation from it. In other words, for
any subsets of MNOs N ⊆M, any network slicing structure
cN , and any imputation x′, we have $j (c′,x′) ≤ $j (c,x).
We have the following result.
Theorem 1: The core of the network slicing game is non-
empty and any outcome in the core maximizes the social
welfare.
Proof: See Appendix A.
VI. DISTRIBUTED OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM
One of the main challenges for the inter-operator network
slicing is to minimize the communication/coordination over-
head between MNOs. In this section, we propose a simple
and distributed algorithm framework that can achieve the
stable and optimal network slicing structure that is in the
core of the network slicing game. Our algorithm is based
on the distributed ADMM [33] algorithm to decompose the
optimization problem into a set of subproblems. Unfortunately,
it is known that the traditional ADMM method can only
solve problems consisting of two blocks of random variables
and therefore cannot be directly applied to solve problem (3)
which consists of a large number of variables. In addition,
the original ADMM method is a centralized approach that
requires all players to reveal their private information to a
central controller. Most existing distributed ADMM methods
focused on designing a consensus mechanism in which the
neighboring agents can exchange and jointly update a local
copy of their model parameters [34]. These methods cannot
be directly applied to solve network slicing problem in inter-
operator systems because MNOs are generally unwilling to
share their private proprietary information with each other.
We propose a D-ADMM-PVS algorithm to optimize the
network slicing for inter-operator systems. In our algorithm
framework, the inter-operator network slicing problem is first
divided into
∑
i∈M |Li| number of sub-problems each of
which can be solved by an individual link (can be either UE
or BS of the corresponding link) of an MNO using its local
information. Each link will submit a single dual variable to its
associated MNO and all the MNO will only coordinate their
collected dual variable using a linear function.
As observed in Section V, the property of transferrable
utility makes MNOs have the incentive to jointly slice their
resources and maximize the total social welfare. Let us write
the social welfare maximization problem for the network
slicing game as follows:
max
u,α
∑
i∈M
∑
k∈Li
∑
l∈Y
$
(l)
k,i
(
u
(l)
k,i, α
(l)
k,i
)
(4a)
s.t.
∑
l∈Y
α
(l)
k,i = ξk,i\D, (4b)
(uk,i +αk,iB
(u))Rk,i  ηi, (4c)∑
l∈Y
u
(l)
k,i ≤
∑
j∈C(l)
Bj , 0 ≤ α(l)k,i ≤ 1, and u(l)k,i ≥ 0,
∀k ∈ Li, l ∈ Y, (4d)
where α = 〈αk,j〉k∈Lj ,j∈M and αk,i = 〈α(l)k,i〉l∈Y are the
vector of channel access probability allocated to all supported
types of services as well as each link, and u = 〈uj〉j∈M,
uk,i = 〈u(l)k,i〉l∈Y , ηi = 〈η(l)i 〉l∈Y is vector of the minimum
QoS required by all the supported types of service offered by
MNO i, and  is the vector inequality. Note that the constraint
in (4b) means that the total probability of channel access
as well as the licensed bandwidth allocated for supporting
all types of services cannot exceed the available channel
access probability as well as the licensed band owned by each
MNO. (4d) means that the aggregate throughput obtained in
both licensed and unlicensed band must satisfy the minimum
throughput requirement for each type of supported service.
Note that in problem (4), we replace supp(c(l)) with the set
of all the MNOsM. This does not impact our results because
the utility division among MNOs in each slice has already
been decided by d(l)k,i. In other words, even if, due to the limit
of the resources, some MNOs choose to not distribute any
licensed resource to support a certain type of services (e.g.,
type l service), this does not mean these MNOs cannot receive
benefit from serving type l services for its UEs because they
can still access the spectrum resource w(l) distributed by other
MNOs. In other words, w(l)i = 0 does not mean pi
(l)
k,i = 0.
Let fk,i(αk,i) =
∑
l∈Y B
(u)ρ
(l)
i Rk,iα
(l)
k,i, and
g(u) =
∑
i∈M
∑
k∈Li
(∑
l∈Y ρ
(l)
i Rk,i
(∑
j∈M u
(l)
k,j
))
.
We can rewrite the objective function in (4a) as the
summation of a set of sub-functions as follows∑
i∈M
∑
k∈Li
fk,i(αk,i) + g(u). (5)
Let us introduce a set of indicator functions to incorporate
constraints (4b) into the objective function. For the separable
constraints (4b), we have
Iαk,i(αk,i) =
{
0, αk,i ∈ Eαk,i,
∞, αk,i /∈ Eαk,i,
, Iu(u) =
{
0, u ∈ Eu,
∞, u /∈ Eu,
(6)
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where
Eαk,i = {αk,i|
∑
l∈Y
α
(l)
k,i = ξk,i\D, 0 ≤ α(l)k,i ≤ 1}, (7)
Eu = {u|
∑
l∈Y
u
(l)
k,i ≤ Bi, u(l)k,i ≥ 0,∀i ∈M}, (8)
where (7) and (8) correspond to the ranges of constraints (4b)
and (4d), respectively. We can incorporate them into objective
functions as follows:
f+k,i(αk,i) = fk,i(αk,i) + Iαk,i, g+(u) = g(u) + Iu(u). (9)
where the first and second terms in (9) correspond to the
objective function in (4a) incorporated with the constraints
(4b) and (4d).
For the inseparable constraint (4c), we also introduce an
indicator function as follows
IZ(X) =
{
0, X ∈ EZ ,
∞, X /∈ EZ ,
, (10)
where X = (α,w), and
EZ = {X|(uk,i +αk,iB(u))Rk,i  ηi}. (11)
We can then reformulate the above optimization problem in
(4) as
max
X,Z
F (X) + IZ(Z), (12a)
s.t. X −Z = 0, (12b)
where F (X) =
∑
i∈M
∑
k∈Li f
+
k,i(αk,i) + g
+(w), and Z
is the auxiliary variable introduced to isolate the inseparable
constraint. The augmented Lagrangian of problem (12) is
Lγ(X,Z,Λ) = F (X)+IZ(Z)+ΛT (X−Z)+γ
2
‖X−Z ‖22,
(13)
where ϑ > 0 is the augmented Lagrangian parameter, and Λ is
the dual variable. We can then follow the same line as standard
ADMM and write the centralized solution for (12) as follows:
X(t+1) := arg min
X
F (X) +
ϑ
2
‖X −Z(t) + Λ(t) ‖22,
(14a)
Z(t+1) := arg min
Z
IZ(Z) + ϑ
2
‖X(t+1) −Z + Λ(t) ‖22,
(14b)
Λ(t+1) = Λ(t) +X(t+1) −Z(t+1), (14c)
where we use superscript (t) to denote the tth iteration.
To solve the above problem in a distributed manner, we split
variable X into a set of sub-vectors, namely αk,i and wi. We
also separate the X-updating step into a set of sub-problems
as follows.
Each link k solves the following αk,i-subproblem for unli-
censed band resource distribution using its local information:
α
(t+1)
k,i = arg minαk,i
f+k,i(αk,i) +
ϑ
2
‖ αk,i −Z(t)k,i + Λ(t)k,i ‖22;
(15)
MNOs will jointly solve the following w-subproblem for
licensed band resource distribution through DSM function
block in the 3GPP network sharing framework:
w(t+1) = arg min
w
g+(w) +
ϑ
2
‖ w −Z(t)w + Λ(t)w ‖22; (16)
A coordinator deployed in the DSM block is responsible for
coordinating the Z-updating in (14b) and the Λ-updating in
(14c). We summarize the details of the proposed algorithm in
Algorithm 1. The convergence rate is presented in Theorem 2.
Algorithm 1 D-ADMM-PVS Algorithm
Initialization: α0, w0, γ > 0, t=1;
for t = 1, 2, ... do
1. Each UE or BS corresponding to the kth link executes
the following steps:
1a) Update α(t+1)k,i according to (15);
1b) Report α(t+1)k,i to the corresponding MNO i;
2. MNOs collect the intermediate results α(t+1)k,i from
their UEs and/or BSs, and report them to the SDN
orchestrator.
3. The regional orchestrator executes the following steps:
3a) Sequentially update w, Z and Λ by following
(16),(14b) and (14c);
3b) Feedback the auxiliary variables Z·,i and the dual
variables Λ·,i to the corresponding MNO i;
4. MNO i feedbacks auxiliary variable Zk,i and dual
variable Λk,i to the UE or BS associated with link k.
if Stopping criteria meets then
break;
end if
t = t+ 1
end for
In the above algorithm, each MNO i needs to solve problem
(15) using its own private information related to each of its
links. Each MNO i sends its calculated solution Z·,i to the
local regional orchestrator. The local orchestrator will then
update the dual variable Λ·,i collected from all the MNOs
and send each MNO with its individual dual variable related
to the sub-problem in (15). In other words, in D-ADMM-PVS
Algorithm, each MNO does not need to disclose its private
information and still can achieve the global optimal solution
of problem (4).
We can prove the following result.
Theorem 2: The augmented Lagrangian form of the ob-
jective function for problem (12a) is separable and convex.
Algorithm 1 maximizes the social welfare.
Proof: See Appendix B.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
To evaluate the performance of our proposed inter-operator
network slicing, we simulate a multi-operator network slicing
architecture using over 400 real BS locations (including both
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Fig. 4. Distribution of BSs deployed by two major MNOs as well as Wi-Fi
hotspots deployed at Starbucks in the city of Dublin.
Parameter Value
Wi-Fi traffic class Voice (AC = VO)
LAA traffic class Voice (PC = 1)
PHY rate 52 Mbps
Unlicensed bandwidth 20 MHz
Transmission power 23 dBms
LAA noise floor −100 dBm
Wi-Fi noise floor −90 dBm
Path Loss Model 43.3 log(d) + 11.5 + 20 log(fc)
Wi-Fi CCA threshold −62 dBm
LAA CCA threshold −62 dBm
Fig. 5. Simulation Parameters
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Fig. 6. Convergence rate of D-ADMM-PVS Algorithm compared to subgra-
dient and centralized ADMM algorithms.
GSM and UMTS BSs) in the city of Dublin deployed by
two major telecom operators in Ireland [35]. We assume
each BS can operate in both licensed and unlicensed bands.
These BSs are coexisting with the Wi-Fi APs installed at 54
Starbucks coffee shops throughout the city [36]. We focus
on the downlink communication from BSs and Wi-Fi APs.
The actual locations and deployment densities of LAA BSs
and Wi-Fi APs are presented in Figure 4. We consider the
Poisson frame arrival rate with intensity λ = 1000 frames per
second for all traffics generated by BSs and Wi-Fi APs. Each
MNO can allocate at most 20MHz bandwidth of its licensed
band and/or negotiate and trade their access right for a 20MHz
unlicensed band in 5.5 GHz unlicensed band.
To evaluate the channel access of coexisting LAA BSs
and Wi-Fi APs in unlicensed band, we develop a C++-based
discrete event simulator using the CSIM development toolkit
[9] with total 3000+ lines of codes to simulate the scheduling
and contention behavior between LAA BSs as well as that
between LAA BSs and Wi-Fi APs.
We implement the most recent LTE-LAA [27] and IEEE
802.11ac standards [29] with channel access parameters listed
in Figure 5. We consider the scenario that both LTE BS and
Wi-Fi APs adopt the contention parameters according to the
traffic class voice (PC=1 for LTE-LAA and AC=VO in Wi-
Fi). BSs and Wi-Fi APs have the same transmit power 23
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dBm and adopt the same CCA threshold -62 dBm. We conduct
each simulation for 10 seconds and collect all the traces and
logs from all BSs and Wi-Fi APs, including time stamps for
frame arrival to MAC queue, time spent in queue, time spent
during contention, time spent during transmission. We consider
two types of service traffics (e.g., audio and video streaming)
supported by both MNOs requiring 10 Mbps and 20 Mbps
minimum guaranteed throughput, respectively.
B. Numerical Results
In Figure 6, we compare the convergence performance of
our proposed D-ADMM-PVS algorithm with the subgradient
with dual decomposition algorithm, one of the most popular
distributed optimization algorithms due to its low computation
complexity. We can observe that D-ADMM-PVS algorithm
converges to the optimal network slicing solution within the
first few iterations. We also present the convergence rate
when a centralized ADMM in [33] can be implemented to
control the network slicing in a centralized fashion. In this
case, a centralized controller (can be deployed according to
3GPP shared radio access network architecture) can collect
all the information from the MNOs and calculate the spectrum
allocation for each slice among all the MNOs. It can be easily
observed that this centralized implementation may result in
a large communication overhead between MNOs. We can
observe that our proposed D-ADMM-PVS algorithm presents
a very similar convergence performance as the centralized
ADMM and can approach a neighborhood of the optimal
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solution within the first 2-3 iterations which is much faster
than the subgradient method.
It is obvious that the decrease of BS deployment density
may result in reduced contention among LAA BSs as well
as the increase of channel access for each LAA link in
unlicensed band. Therefore, we have carefully chosen nine
subregions from the rural areas to the city center of Dublin
with different BS deployment densities to evaluate the impact
of the network density on the performance of network slicing.
We first investigate the total traffic that can be admitted for
each type of service when MNOs can cooperate and jointly
slice both licensed and unlicensed band. In particular, in
Figure 7, we present the total traffic admitted in licensed
and unlicensed bands by our proposed inter-operator network
slicing framework. We observe that allowing MNOs to jointly
access licensed and unlicensed bands can significantly increase
the traffic volume admitted for all the supported services.
Interestingly, we can observe that the portion of the admitted
traffic for type 1 service in the licensed band decreases with
the channel access probability in unlicensed band. This is
because the unlicensed band is free and when the channel
access probability becomes large, it is more economic for
MNOs to offload more traffic from licensed band to unlicensed
band.
We then investigate the impact of allowing licensed band
spectrum sharing and/or unlicensed band right sharing on the
overall traffic that can be admitted for each individual type
of service. In Figure 8, we consider three different scenarios:
S1) unlicensed band only slicing in which each MNO can only
share and trade spectrum access right of unlicensed band with
other MNOs, S2) licensed band only slicing in which MNOs
only share and jointly slice the licensed band spectrum, and
S3) joint slicing of licensed and unlicensed band. We observe
that the volume of traffic admitted for type 1 service is always
more than that admitted for type 2 service. This is because
type 2 service has a higher minimum throughput requirement
and also charge a higher prices compared to the type 1 service.
Therefore, it is more profitable for MNOs to serve more traffic
for type 2 service.
It is known that the traffic that can be admitted by each
service type is also closely related to the infrastructure de-
ployment density. Generally speaking, the higher the density
of BSs, the more traffics can be requested and served by each
individual BS. In Figures 9, we assume each cell serves equal
number of UEs uniformly randomly located in the coverage
area and study the impact of the cell size on the total traffic that
can be supported for each type of service. We consider various
popular cell sizes from small cell (≈ 100 meter) to macro cell
(≈ 1000 meter). We observe that the admitted traffic decreases
with the cell size. This is because with the increase of the cell
size, the average distance between UEs and the associated
BS also increases. This limits the total number of UEs that
can be served with the minimum throughput requirement. We
can also observe that when the cell size becomes large, the
unlicensed band become less congested and therefore more
traffic will be sent through the unlicensed band for both types
of services. Also unlike the licensed band slicing in which the
traffic admitted for type 2 service is much higher than that
admitted for type 1 service, the traffic transmitted through the
unlicensed bands for both types of service are very similar.
In Figure 10, we again consider different scenarios S1)-S3)
to compare the performance of MNOs when they can only
cooperate in either licensed or unlicensed band, or both. We
observe that if MNOs can only cooperate in the unlicensed
band, more type 2 service traffic will be offloaded to the
unlicensed band compared to the type 1 service.
For a limited network resource, the traffic volume that can
be supported for each type of services is also affected by the
QoS requirement, that is the minimum throughput that must
be guaranteed. The higher the required minimum throughput,
the smaller the volume of traffic that can be admitted for
the service. To study the impact of the QoS requirement
on the traffic that can be supported by the licensed and
unlicensed band resources, we fix the minimum throughput
required by one particular type of service (service type 2) to
η
(2)
i = 20 Mbps and compare the traffic volumes admitted by
each supported service under different minimum throughput
required by the other service type (service type 1) in Figures
11. We observe that the traffic that can be admitted by service
type 2 decreases with the minimum throughput required by
service type 1. In other words, the MNOs tend to obtain more
benefit from the service that has a higher QoS requirement.
This is consistent with our observation in Figures 7–10.
However, the increasing speed of the admitted traffic becomes
slower and when the minimum throughput of service type 1
increases above a certain threshold (e.g., 40Mbps), the traffic
volume admitted to each supported service approaches to the
maximum throughput that can be supported by the available
licensed and unlicensed band resources.
In Figure 12, we compare the admitted traffic when MNOs
can only cooperate in either licensed or unlicensed band,
i.e., scenarios S1)-S3), as mentioned at the beginning of this
subsection. We observe that both licensed and unlicensed band
only scenarios exhibit a similar trend, that is, most of the
admitted traffic is associated with the service type that has the
higher minimum throughput requirement. We also observe that
the total traffic that can be admitted by unlicensed band only
slicing is much lower than that admitted by the licensed band
only slicing scenario due to the limited channel occupancy
time (TXOP duration) for each successful channel access.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the inter-operator network slicing
over licensed and unlicensed bands. We develop inter-operator
spectrum aggregation method for licensed band slicing and
introduce the concept of right sharing for inter-operator net-
work slicing in unlicensed band. An mBoE method has been
introduced for each MNO to evaluate its benefit in unlicensed
band with and without the possible contention from other
coexisting MNOs as well as other wireless technologies.
An overlapping coalition formation game-based framework
called network slicing game has been formulated to study the
interaction between MNOs in licensed and unlicensed bands.
To reduce the communication overhead between MNOs and
preserve the private information of each MNO, we develop
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a distributed optimization algorithm based on D-ADMM-PVS
for inter-operator network slicing. To evaluate the practical
performance of our proposed framework, we consider the
possible implementation of LAA BSs over 400 real BS lo-
cations of two major MNOs as well as the real Wi-Fi AP
locations in the city of Dublin. We develop a C++-based
discrete-event simulator to evaluate the contention behavior of
LAA BSs and Wi-Fi APs in unlicensed band. Our numerical
results show that our proposed network slicing framework
significantly increases the admitted traffics for all supported
services especially in the urban environment with high BS
deployment density.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the core of the network slicing game is always non-
empty, we need to first prove that the network slicing game
belongs to a special overlapping coalition game that satisfies
the property called ‘convexity’. This means that a coalition
can obtain more benefit when it joins a larger coalition. Let
F (M) be the set of all feasible network slicing agreements.
We abuse the notation and use cC to denote a network slicing
agreement mutually agreed by MNOs in coalition C. We give
a formal definition as follows.
Definition 5: [32, Definition 13] An overlapping coalition
formation game is convex if for each C ⊆ M and N ⊂
O ⊆M\C, the following condition holds: for any cN ,xN ∈
F (N ), any 〈cO,xO〉 ∈ F (O), and any 〈cN∪C ,xN∪C〉 ∈
F (N ∪ C) that satisfies $i
(
cN∪C ,xN∪C
) ≥ $i (cN ,xN ),
∀i ∈ N , there exists an outcome 〈cO∪C ,xO∪C〉 ∈ F (O ∪ C)
such that $i
(
cO∪C ,xO∪C
) ≥ $i (cO,xO), ∀i ∈ O and
$i
(
cO∪C ,xO∪C
) ≥$i (cN∪C ,xN∪C), ∀i ∈ C.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: A network slicing game is convex.
Proof: We can observe that the utility function of the
network slicing game is a linear function of all the possible
licensed and unlicensed bands that can be accessed by all
the cooperative MNOs. In other words, the more MNOs
join the same coalition, the more licensed bands as well as
the unlicensed spectrum access rights can be accessed by
the member MNOs. We can observe that problem (1a) is a
linear function of w(l)i and α
(l)
k,i. In addition, as mentioned in
Sections IV and V, each MNO will only form a coalition with
other MNOs if it cannot obtain a higher utility by forming
a coalition with other subsets of MNOs. Let us write the
solution of problem (1a) as 〈wC∗i ,αC∗i 〉 when the maximum
set of MNOs that can share their spectrum with each other
to support all services is given by C. We can apply the
standard convex optimization method to prove that the solution
$i
(〈wC∗i ,αC∗i 〉) satisfies the following properties:
$i
(〈wO∪C∗i ,αO∪C∗i 〉) ≥ $i (〈wO∗i ,αO∗i 〉) ,
$i
(〈wO∪C∗i ,αO∪C∗i 〉) ≥ $i (〈wN∪C∗i ,αN∪C∗i 〉) ,
∀N ⊂ O ⊆M\C. (17)
We can therefore claim that the network slicing game is
convex. This concludes the proof.
We can then use the following theorem given in [32] to
prove the non-emptiness of the core for any network slicing
game.
Theorem 3: [32, Theorem 3] If an overlapping coalition
formation game is convex, and the worth v is continuous,
bounded, monotone and the maximum number of partial
coalitions that each MNO can be involved in is finite, then
the core of the game is not empty.
From Section V, we can directly observe that the worth of
the network slicing game satisfies all the above conditions.
Therefore, we can claim that the core of the network slicing
game is always non-empty. From the definition of the core
and following the same line as [32], we can also prove that a
network slicing agreement 〈c,x〉 is in the core if and only if∑
i∈M
$i (c,x) ≥ v∗ (M) , (18)
where v∗ (M) is the supremum of v (M). In other words,
any outcome in the core maximizes the social welfare. This
concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We can observe that fk,i (αk,i) is a linear function of
α
(l)
k,i and g (w) is a linear function of w. Therefore, we can
claim that the objective function as well as its corresponding
augmented Lagrangian form in (13) is convex and separable.
We can then following the same line as the standard ADMM
approach in [33] to prove optimality and the linear conver-
gence rate of Algorithm 1.
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